There was quite a bit of chaos on the Internet today, including major fiber cuts in California. To add to this confusion, between 5:24pm and around 6:10pm Pacific on June 30th, social media and outage reports indicated some issues with Amazon, AWS and a variety of services that run on AWS. In our office, we realized HipChat (our internal messaging system) and Okta (our SSO provider) were not working. And neither was our corporate website, which is hosted on AWS EC2 and fronted by AWS CloudFront.
This demo secretly makes requests to STUN servers that can log your request. These requests do not show up in developer consoles and cannot be blocked by browser plugins (AdBlock, Ghostery, etc.).
https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips
Firefox and Chrome have implemented WebRTC that allow requests to STUN servers be made that will return the local and public IP addresses for the user. These request results are available to javascript, so you can now obtain a users local and public IP addresses in javascript. This demo is an example implementation of that.
Additionally, these STUN requests are made outside of the normal XMLHttpRequest procedure, so they are not visible in the developer console or able to be blocked by plugins such as AdBlockPlus or Ghostery. This makes these types of requests available for online tracking if an advertiser sets up a STUN server with a wildcard domain.
Using NSEC is relatively simple, but it has a nasty side-effect: it allows anyone to list the zone content by following the linked list of NSEC records. This is called 'zone walking'. The 'ldns' library contains an tool called 'ldns-walk' that can be used to list all records inside a DNSSEC signed zone that uses NSEC:
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For some DNS zones, this is an issue. The NSEC3 record option in DNSSEC solves this by creating the linked list using hashed domain-names, instead of clear-text domain names.
voir aussi https://www.dnsleaktest.com/
On 14 November 2014, the Italian Presidency presented amendments to the Telecommunications package for comment by the Member State delegations. We are hereby making the document and its annexes publicly available (Note and addendum). These documents show that the Italian Presidency is now back-pedalling on meaningful net neutrality protections – having previously made some much more meaningful and positive suggestions. It presented a “principles-based approach” to the Member States “in order not to inhibit innovation and to avoid” having an outdated regulation in the future. In reality, all the text would do is add confusion for freedom of communication and online innovation.
Le fonds de défense de la neutralité du net s'est fait mettre à la porte par sa banque, il a donc dû en catastrophe trouver un autre banquier, et est en train de remettre en place ses services. Récit et explications.
When using an anonymity or privacy service, it is extremely important that all traffic originating from your computer is routed through the anonymity network. If any traffic leaks outside of the secure connection to the network, any adversary monitoring your traffic will be able to log your activity. DNS or the domain name system is used to translate domain names such as www.privacyinternational.org into numerical IP addresses e.g. 123.123.123.123 which are required to route packets of data on the Internet. Whenever your computer needs to contact a server on the Internet, such as when you enter a URL into your browser, your computer contacts a DNS server and requests the IP address. Most Internet service providers assign their customers a DNS server which they control and use for logging and recording your Internet activities. Under certain conditions, even when connected to the anonymity network, the operating system will continue to use its default DNS servers instead of the anonymous DNS servers assigned to your computer by the anonymity network. DNS leaks are a major privacy threat since the anonymity network may be providing a false sense of security while private data is leaking.